That is largely why Knox County has caught the attention of the intelligence community: It may hint at what could come on Election Day. Several cybersecurity professionals pointed out that Tennessee’s reporting system is like any other in the country, unregulated equipment comprised simply of network switches and internet cables. And Knox County, if anything — with its large budget and sizable IT staff — is better defended than most county election staffs will be this November.

“On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the Pentagon’s [security measures], elections have probably moved from a 2 to a 3.”

The basic configuration of American elections dates to 1890 — a chaotic ritual designed, literally, for another century.

At a recent conference on election security, Orange County Registrar of Voters Neal Kelley said he’d asked former CIA Director Michael Hayden if Russian hackers will try to disrupt the 2018 mid-term elections. “He didn’t hesitate,” Kelley recounted. “He said, ‘They will be targeting congressional races.’” In Southern California, home to some of the nation’s most-competitive congressional contests, that threat is being taken seriously. Consider just a few of the many new security protocols being adopted by election officials in the four-county region.

Office emails are being encrypted and networks buttressed. Election employees are randomly being mock phished to see if they’ll fall for simulated online invaders. Federal officials are being invited to inspect and test the region’s many voting systems. Even the seemingly oldest of old-school safety protocols — counting up some election results by hand — is expected to play an expanded role in the 2018 midterms. The local upgrades are part of a national response to Russia’s meddling in America’s 2016 elections. Intelligence agencies have determined that, among other things, Russian agents and their operatives executed a cyberattack on a U.S. voting software supplier, sent spear-phishing emails to election officials, and targeted voter rolls in at least 21 states, breaching a small (but undisclosed) number of them.

California’s voting infrastructure is, in many ways, far more secure than those of most other states. Counties in California are legally required to keep paper ballots as fixed records of electronic voting tallies and to hand-count the ballots cast at one percent of all precincts to verify digital totals. That means even if voting machines are compromised, there’s a physical backup to warn of a discrepancy.

In Los Angeles County, home to another one of the nation’s most competitive congressional races, Logan has educated his staff on cyber threats by having them see firsthand how voting machines can be hacked.

Last year, he sent members of his team to DEF CON in Las Vegas, one of the world’s largest hacker conventions. There, at something called the “Voting Machine Hacking Village,” they watched white-hat hackers “go through and show the vulnerability of voting systems,” a process that helped Logan’s office identify its own potential shortcomings. Since the 2016 elections, the office has upgraded its malware protection and mandated cybersecurity training for staff. It soon will implement vulnerability-assessment and phishing exercises to further test its new systems. “If we don’t know those vulnerabilities, we can’t respond to them,” Logan said at the conference.

San Francisco’s system is typical, said John Arntz, the city’s elections chief. There’s an “air gap” in the electronic voting machines and the equipment that tallies the votes, he said. Those machines “are never connected to the Internet,” Arntz said. “The way the system is set up, if someone physically hacked into one voting machine, they couldn’t affect the other machines, because they’re not connected. And even then, they’d have to just about destroy the machine to hack in.”

California has another safeguard, which Arntz called “the ultimate fail-safe.” Since 2006, all touch-screen voting systems in the state have had to provide a paper receipt that confirms the electronic totals. About a dozen states allow electronic voting without requiring a paper trail audit.

Texas voters: Take your time when casting ballots.

This advice comes as state election officials receive complaints across the state from early voters casting straight tickets on Hart eSlate machines who believe the machines changed their votes.

Two complaints, reported through a third party, have been made in Tarrant County, said Heider Garcia, elections administrator.

“We have ... tested everything,” he said. “We don’t have any indication that there’s a technical issue.”

The Texas Secretary of State’s Office has issued a statement about the issue.

“As a reminder, voters should always carefully check their review screen before casting their ballots,” states the advisory issued by Keith Ingram, director of elections with the Texas Secretary of State’s office. “If a voter has any problems, they should notify a poll worker immediately so the issues can be addressed and reported.”

This comes as a near record number of early voters are heading to the polls, just as they did during the 2016 presidential election. Similar concerns were reported during the 2016 presidential election.

Election officials ask Texas voters to slow down and be careful when choosing the candidates they want to receive their votes.

“There’s no rush,” Garcia said. “If you’ve been in line 30 minutes to vote, take 30 extra seconds to review the ballot before you cast it.”

Early voting began Monday and runs through Nov. 2.

Early voting machines

The problem is being reported when voters use the Hart InterCivic eSlate machines that are found in Tarrant County and across the state.

After entering a four-digit access code voters receive when checking in, they use a wheel to “select” candidates and an enter button to navigate the ballot.

When all the choices are made, a summary page will list candidates chosen for each race. At that point, voters have a chance to go back and vote in races they might have accidentally skipped or where they see errors.

“The “enter” button on a Hart eSlate selects a voter’s choice. The selection wheel button on a Hart eSlate allows the voter to move up and down the ballot,” Ingram’s advisory stated. “It is important when voting on a Hart eSlate machine for the voter to use one button or the other and not both simultaneously, and for the voter to not hit the “Enter” button or use the selection wheel button until a page is fully rendered.

“A voter should note the response to the voter’s action on the keyboard prior to taking another keyboard action. It is also important for the voter to verify their selections are correct before casting their ballot.”

Election officials say voters should carefully review their ballot — and take as much time needed — before hitting the button to cast their vote.

Flipping votes

Evelyn Brown, a 63-year-old longtime Fort Worth voter, said she had a problem voting this week.

She had gone to the Southwest Community Center on Welch Avenue and had cast a straight party ticket.

When she reviewed the summary, she saw that her choice in the U.S. Senate race — which pits Republican U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz against Democratic challenger U.S. Rep. Beto O’Rourke — had flipped to the candidate in the other party.

She spent seven or eight minutes trying to move back to change the candidate in that race, but wasn’t successful.

“I’m accustomed to using the booth,” she said. “I used the keys that let you move forward and back. It didn’t move at all. It was stuck.”

So she called the election judge over who ended up calling the Tarrant County Elections Office.

In the end, the election judge had to at least temporarily put that machine out of service. He moved Brown to a different machine, where she said she was able to cast a vote for all the candidates of her choice.

Notes are posted at voting booths from election officials stressing that voters need to check the summary page “before casting your ballot.”